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Abstract 
The long-run evolution of rent sharing is empirically studied. Based upon a comprehensive and 
harmonized panel of the top 300 publicly quoted British companies over thirty five years, the paper reports 
evidence of a significant fall over time in the extent to which firms share rents with workers. It confirms 
that companies do share their profits with employees, but at much smaller scale today than they did during 
the 1980s and 1990s. This is a robust finding, corroborated with industry-level analysis for the US and EU. 
The decline in rent sharing is coincident with the rise of product market power that has occurred as worker 
bargaining power has dropped. Although firms with more market power previously shared more of their 
profits, they experienced a stronger fall in rent sharing after 2000. 
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I. Introduction 
Stagnating real wages and falling labour shares across developed economies have 
stimulated a renewed interest in the question of how, and to what extent, rents are shared with 
labour (Krueger, 1999; Gollin, 2002; Fleck et al., 2011; Pessoa and Van Reenen 2013; 2014; 
Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Stansbury and Summers, 2017; Bridgman, 2017). When 
workers receive less from what they produce, and rents are re-directed towards concentrated 
capital, inequalities rise as economic growth is no longer inclusive (Piketty, 2014).  
The recent literature initially tended to focus on the macro- or sectoral-level 
determinants of labour share, highlighting the influence of technology (Acemoglu, 2003a, 
Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Lawrence, 2015), trade (Autor et al., 2014; 2016) and 
institutions (Acemoglu, 2003b). However, since the wage-setting process is the domain of 
companies, an increasing number of studies have turned their attention to firms (Card et al. 
2018). Several authors connect falling firm labour share with growing market concentration 
and the emergence of ‘superstar’ companies (Autor et al., 2017; Barkai, 2016; De Loecker and 
Eeckhout, 2017; Adrjan, 2018). The question is why more market power translates into a lower 
labour share? A classic account is that workers lose bargaining power, and therefore reduced 
rent sharing (Nickell and Wadhwani, 1990). However, and at least in part owing to a lack of 
data, the reality is that little is known about long-run changes in rent sharing. 
This paper aims to redress this by looking at the long-run evolution of rent sharing 
among UK-domiciled companies. In a perfectly competitive labour market there should be no 
relationship between firm-level wages and productivity, because firms take market wages as 
given. The extensive empirical literature of the past, however, consistently showed there to be 
a positive effect of firm rents on average worker compensation (e.g. Nickell and Wadhwani, 
1990; Van Reenen, 1996). This is also the case in the newer revival of interest in rent sharing 
(e.g. Card et al., 2018; Kline et al., 2018). The most common explanation relates this effect to 
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the bargaining power of workers, which allows them to claim a portion of a firm’s rents. 
Knowing how rent sharing has evolved over time can therefore help understand changes in the 
position of workers within companies and shed light on the mechanisms behind the fall in the 
labour share.  
To examine the long run shifts, the primary analysis is based upon the construction of 
a comprehensive and consistent panel of the top 300 companies by market capitalisation listed 
on the London Stock Exchange from 1983 until 2016. Firm-level information was manually 
collected from annual reports and combined with various existing databases. The construction 
of the dataset ensures the coverage of the entire economy and limits the sample selection bias. 
Overall, the panel consists of 843 firms, which together employ over 7 million workers 
worldwide (2016) and constitute around 95% of total UK market capitalization. The data in the 
sample refers to the global operations of UK-domiciled companies. The analysis is 
complemented through the study of data on domestic UK operations, from a panel of UK 
manufacturing companies from the Annual Respondents Database and the Annual Business 
Survey. 
The empirical approach draws on and extends beyond the older and newer rent sharing 
literatures. To begin with, the rent-sharing coefficient is estimated using a dynamic firm fixed-
effect model, which controls for all time-invariant firm characteristics. In particular, it comes 
from a regression of log compensation per employee on contemporaneous and lagged profits 
per employee, and measures of external forces (the unemployment rate, industry-level wages, 
and time fixed effects). Potential endogeneity is dealt with by instrumenting the lagged 
dependent variable and the current and lagged profits in the first-differenced model with their 
lagged levels (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
Based upon these conventional means of estimating the degree of rent sharing, the first 
result to emerge is of a positive and statistically significant rent-sharing parameter. Estimating 
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over the whole sample this rent sharing elasticity is fairly modest in magnitude, and towards 
the lower end of estimates from other firm-level studies (Card et al., 2018). The second, more 
novel result concerns the time series evolution of rent sharing. There is a substantial fall in the 
long-run elasticity from 0.043 in the period 1983-2000 to 0.012 in the period 2001-2016. The 
finding of a significantly reduced rent sharing parameter proves robust to various specification 
checks and alternative definitions of the sample. Moreover, the same result emerges for the 
panel of UK manufacturing companies, which provides data on domestic operations only. In 
addition, industry-level data for the US and for nine EU countries again show the same pattern. 
Consistent with the firm analysis, there is a strongly falling correlation between log 
compensation per employee and profits per employee for almost all countries since the early 
2000s (EU) and the 1970-80s (US). 
The final part of the study moves on to mechanisms. A firm-level measure of market 
power (market share) is computed and used to explore the extent to which companies with 
higher market power share more or less of their profits. First, and consistent with recent work 
(Autor et al., 2017; Barkai, 2016; De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017; Hall, 2018)1 median market 
share increases among UK companies since 1983. Second, companies with higher market 
power share on average more of their rents than companies with low power. Third, the positive 
association between market power and rent sharing is significantly weaker in the period 2001-
2016 compared to 1983-2001. In other words, the fall in rent sharing was more pronounced 
among the companies which enjoy monopolistic markups. 
The findings have implications for the debate on the future of labour. A decline in rent 
sharing implies growing labour market inequalities and may encourage calls for a bigger role 
1 For an opposite view that criticises the detail of this work, see Traina (2018). Hall (2018) looks at the issue in a 
different way, computing shifts in market power from industry price/marginal cost markups (in similar ways to 
his earlier classic study of market power), concluding similarly to De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) that markups 
have risen through time in the US, but not at quite the same rate as their study (where costs are measured only 
using accounting information on costs of goods sold).  
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for redistributive policies. It also suggests a fundamental change in the competitiveness of the 
labour market. A weaker bargaining position of workers might be a result of technological 
change (‘robocalypse’), higher labour mobility and institutional change (e.g. decline in unions). 
Finally, companies with higher market power experience relatively larger falls in rent sharing, 
suggesting that competition policies should also be analysed from the labour market 
perspective. As these companies are increasingly global, one might expect these trends to 
become world-wide phenomena. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II briefly discusses the related 
theoretical and empirical literature on the links between firm rents and wages. Section III 
provides details of the data construction and presents summary statistics on performance and 
compensation in the sample. The firm-level results are presented in Section IV and the 
industry-level results in Section V. Section VI provides evidence for the links between market 
power and the fall in rent sharing. Section VII concludes. 
II. Rent Sharing
II.A. Theoretical Considerations
A positive correlation between wages and profit is not a feature of a standard perfect 
competition model. Wages are given and do not depend on firm characteristics. If a company 
experiences a productivity or demand shock, it will increase employment, but keep wages 
fixed. In more realistic models, a portion of the shock is captured by workers in the form of 
higher wages. There are at least three ways this result can occur (Blanchflower et al., 1996). 
The first is a monopsonistic model with an upward sloping short-run labour supply curve. The 
second is an incentive pay model, where risk-averse workers and firms share gains and losses. 
The third approach incorporates a wage bargaining process between workers and firms.  
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In the monopsonistic model with an upward sloping short-run labour supply curve, a 
positive correlation between wages and profits appears only in the short run because of a 
demand shock. When the economy is hit by a positive shock, companies move up along the 
supply curve, and profits will rise together with employment and wages. As long as the 
elasticity of labour demand is less than unity, profits per worker and wages will increase at the 
same time and this co-movement disappears once the economy reaches a new equilibrium. 
However, the evidence suggests that rent sharing is a long-run phenomenon (e.g. Nickell and 
Wadhwani, 1990; Blanchflower et al., 1996; Van Reenen, 1996; Hildreth and Oswald, 1997). 
The incentive pay model with job contracts that share gains and losses between risk-
averse firms and workers is characterized by equilibrium rent sharing. When effort is hard to 
monitor, but output observable (e.g. sales), it might be optimal to offer a piece rate pay scheme, 
which directly links wages with the output. Because the level of output is only partially 
explained by a worker’s effort, one can observe a positive correlation between wages and 
productivity shocks in the short and long run (Baily, 1974; Azariadis, 1975; Lazear, 1986; 
Brown, 1990). The problem with this hypothesis is that piece rate systems are rarely used 
outside very specific occupations and jobs. 
Given the shortcoming of the two previous theories, the most widely used approach 
assumes a bargaining model over wages. Suppose employees wish to maximize the difference 
between their firm’s wages ݓ and the outside option ݓഥ . Let ߶ denotes the bargaining power of 
employees. Firms maximize profits ߨ ൌ ݂ሺݕሻ െ ݎ݇ െ ݓ݊. Employees and firms engage in a 
Nash bargain, with a standard maximization problem: 
݉ܽݔ	ሾ߶ lnൣ൫ݑሺݓሻ െ ݑሺݓഥሻ൯݊൧ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߶ሻln	ሺߨሻሿ 
In the event of a bargaining breakdown, the firm earns zero profits and the employees earn the 
outside option. The first-order condition with respect to wages is: 
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݊߶ݑᇱሺݓሻ
൫ݑሺݓሻ െ ݑሺݓഥሻ൯݊ െ
݊ሺ1 െ ߶ሻ
ߨ ൌ 0 
Using a first order Taylor approximation formula: ݑሺݓഥሻ ≅ ݑሺݓሻ ൅ ሺݓഥ െ ݓሻݑᇱሺݓሻ, one can 
rewrite the above equation to produce:  
ݓ ≅ ൬ ߶1 െ ߶൰
ߨ
݊ ൅ ݓഥ  
This equation relates the firm’s wages with the outside option, the worker’s bargaining 
power and the firm’s profits per employee. The outside option depends on market wages in 
other companies (ݓ௢) and the unemployment rate (ܷ) – the probability of finding an alternative 
job. The insider force is profit per employee. The equilibrium wage can be then expressed as a 
function of all the above factors: 
ݓ ൌ ܹሺݓ௢, ܷ, ߶, ߨ, ݊ሻ 
This relationship motivates the main empirical specification described in Section IV.  
II.B. Existing Empirical Evidence
There is by now a vast literature investigating the relationship between wages and 
profits. The early studies used a panel of US manufacturing industries. Katz and Summers 
(1989) find evidence for a positive and significant correlation between wages and profits, with 
an implied rent-sharing elasticity of around 0.04. Since profitable industries might employ 
more high-skill workers, it is important to control for the time-varying quality of the workforce. 
Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) supplement the industry data with measures of 
worker quality from the CPS and estimate the rent-sharing coefficient between 0.01 and 0.06. 
Estavao and Tevlin (2003) use similar data but find a much larger elasticity of 0.14 when rents 
are instrumented with demand shocks in downstream sectors. 
An increased focus on firm-level studies arose during the 1990s after a series of 
influential papers analysing British companies. Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) use a panel of 
the UK listed firms from 1975 to 1982 and estimate the elasticity in the range of 0.068-0.093. 
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In follow-up work, Nickell, Vainiomaki and Wadhwani (1994) find no relationship between 
product market power and rent-sharing. In an early attempt to account for the potential 
endogeneity problem between wages and firm performance, Van Reenen (1996) employs a 
measure of technology innovations (patents) as an instrument for quasi rents in a panel of large 
British manufacturing firms. The author finds that instrumenting rents more than doubles the 
rent-sharing elasticity, from 0.11 to 0.29.  These findings were later confirmed by Hildreth and 
Oswald (1997) and Hildreth (1998), who report the elasticity in the range of 0.02-0.03 when 
rents were instrumented with lagged values, and much larger - around 0.17 - when instrumented 
with a measure of innovation. Similarly, Abowd and Lemieux (1993) using a panel of Canadian 
collective bargaining agreements, find a zero correlation between quasi-rents and negotiated 
wages in a simple OLS regression, but a large elasticity of 0.22 when quasi-rents are 
instrumented with industry import and export prices.  
More recently there has been a revival of interest in rent sharing. The newer studies 
often exploit employee-employer matched data and document a relatively small elasticity of 
individual wages with respect to firm-level measures of rents. Drawing on a Portuguese panel 
of workers and firms, Cardoso and Portela (2009), Martins (2009) and Card, Cardoso and Kline 
(2016) find an elasticity in the range of 0.03-0.09, even when rents are instrumented with a 
potential exposure to export shocks (Martins, 2009). Using an administrative data set from 
Italy, Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005) and Card, Devicienti and Maida (2014) document 
an elasticity ranging from 0.06 to 0.08, with rents instrumented by firm-averages of sales and 
workers from other Italian regions (Card et al., 2014). Bagger, Christensen and Mortensen 
(2014) use Danish data to show heterogeneity in rent sharing across industries, with  the 
elasticity between 0.05 and 0.13 – with trade at the upper end of the spectrum and transportation 
and communication at the lower end. Elasticities within the range of 0.01-0.12 are also reported 
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in France (Margolis and Salvanes, 2001; Fakhfakh and FitzRoy, 2004), Germany (Guertzgen, 
2009) and Sweden (Arai, 2003; Arai and Hayman, 2009; Carlsson, Messina and Skans, 2016). 
The availability, and if available validity, of instrumental variables estimates in this 
literature remains a contentious issue. Studies that exploit firm-level variation in a plausibly 
exogenous instrument tend to suffer from a weak instrument problem. As a result, most studies 
instrument firm-level rents with industry-level rents. As Manning (2010) points out, if labour 
has an industry-specific component and there is a positive shock to industry profits, then this 
raises the demand for labour in a competitive model and should lead to higher wages 
(represented by a rise in ݓഥ  in the above equation). In such a case, it is not clear that industry-
level rents serve as a valid instrument for firm-level rents. In most of this paper, Arellano-Bond 
estimates based upon two-period (and before) lags to instrument are used. However, estimates 
using a leave-out industry measure as an instrument for firm-level rents are also reported, with 
similar findings emerging. 
Maybe surprisingly, not many studies have investigated the evolution of rent sharing. 
The likely reason is the lack of a consistent firm-level panel which would be long enough to 
capture changes, that would be comprehensive enough to cover all sectors and that include 
information on compensation and profits. For instance, US company-level data from Standard 
and Poor’s (S&P) Compustat goes back to the 1960s. However only a small (and changing) 
subset of firms contains information on compensation, as disclosure of this information is not 
obligatory. A notable exception is a study by Bell and Van Reenen (2011), which uses the 
matched US manufacturing worker-industry data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
and National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Productivity Database. The authors report 
an elasticity of around 0.05 in the period between 1964 and 1985, which falls to zero between 
1986 and 2005. Benmelech, Bergman and Kim (2018) also report a fall in the elasticity of 
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wages with respect to labour productivity between 1977 and 2009 for US manufacturing 
companies.   
Overall, the literature shows that the predictions of the perfectly competitive model that 
wages do not depend on firm’s rents is not supported in the data - a proportion of rents has 
been shared with workers. Across various countries and industries, the rent-sharing elasticity 
is usually estimated to be below 0.10, but this estimate tends to increase when instrumental 
variables are used. Due to the lack of data, however, very little is known about the temporal 
evolution of rent sharing. In the following sections, a novel dataset on UK-domiciled firms is 
used to fill this gap. 
III. Data
III.A. Firm-Level Data
UK publicly listed companies have been required to report staff costs in their company 
accounts since 1983. However, the existing datasets on listed companies (e.g. Worldscope) 
have very poor coverage of the 1980s and early 1990s. The alternative is to use official surveys 
of firms, but until 1995 the surveys were either short lived (e.g. Cambridge DTI) or were 
limited to only the manufacturing sector (e.g. ARD). Since the existing data are not suitable 
for the research questions posed here, instead a comprehensive and consistent panel of British 
public companies was constructed by drawing from published annual reports and existing 
databases. 
The top 300 companies by market capitalization listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) between 1983 and 2016 are studied. To obtain these data, several steps were taken. First, 
the universe of listed companies was obtained from the London Share Price Database (LSPD), 
which records information on all listings that have been traded on the London Stock Exchange 
since 1955. The universe of listings was restricted to only those domiciled in the UK and 
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exclude investment trusts, unit trusts and real estate trusts, as well as secondary shares. The 
black lines in Figure 1 display the total and selected number of firms listed on the LSE in the 
sample window (1983-2016). The population of companies is on average 27% smaller than the 
raw number of listings, but the two series have an almost identical evolution. Next, for every 
year between 1983 and 2017 the top 300 companies by market capitalization were selected, 
but those in the top for less than three years in total were excluded. Having established the list 
of companies, data were collected for all years (within 1983-2016) when a company was 
publicly listed, even when it was outside the top 300. The resulting panel consists of 13,512 
observations for 843 companies, which together employ over 7 million workers worldwide 
(2016) and constitute around 95% of total UK market capitalization. The construction of the 
dataset ensures coverage of the entire economy and limits the sample selection bias. This is of 
crucial importance for the long-run analysis given the dramatic shift of employment from 
manufacturing to service sectors over the sample period. In the remainder of the paper this 
panel is referred to as the ‘top 300’ sample. 
The grey line in Figure 1 shows the top 300 sample size in comparison to the total 
number of companies listed on the LSE. Figure 2 decomposes the sample into observations 
that are at the top in a given year and observations outside the top (but are at the top in another 
year). By construction, the number of observations peaks in the middle period (1994-1998) 
because that period captures three types of companies: companies at the top in that period, 
companies at the top in the beginning of the time window (which are still alive in 1994-1998) 
and companies at the top in the end of the window (which already existed in the 1990s).  The 
edges of the window (e.g. 1983 or 2016) have fewer observations as they capture fewer of 
those companies which were at the top in other years. The fluctuation in the number of 
companies at the top (the dashed line) is a result of the rule that companies must be at the top 
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for at least three years to enter the sample. In particular, the dot-com bubble of 1999-2001 
created a lot of high-valued but short-lived tech companies.  
The LSPD contains limited information on a firm’s characteristics and accounts. 
Financial data were collected either manually from annual reports or from existing datasets. 
The main data provider is Thomson Reuters Worldscope, complemented with S&P Compustat, 
Exstat, Bureau van Dijk (BvD) ORBIS, BvD FAME and Cambridge DTI. Company-years 
were matched across the dataset using unique identifiers (SEDOL and ISIN) and company 
name. Over 1,700 company-years in the sample are not covered by the existing datasets, 
variables were manually collected from scans of published financial reports available at 
Mergent Archive and Companies House. 
When looking at more than thirty years of data, changes in the formal organization of 
companies are the norm rather than the exception. Most of the companies in the sample 
encountered some form of reorganization, merger or acquisition (M&A). This often leads to a 
discontinuous change in wages and profits per employee, which might introduce noise into the 
estimates. Whenever a company takes over another one and a new legal entity is created, the 
time series of the two companies are separated out and given a specific id/fixed effect for the 
new entity (if publicly listed). In many cases, however, the takeovers are relatively minor and 
do not result in substantial legal changes (except for the purchased company, which 
disappears). These cases were manually identified and a dummy variable control for them was 
incorporated into regressions.  
The data in the ‘top 300’ sample refers to the global operations of UK-domiciled 
companies. To see whether the main results hold for domestic operations, a panel of UK 
manufacturing (production sector) companies was set up using data from Annual Respondents 
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Database (ARD) for 1979 - 2008 and Annual Business Survey (ABS) for 2008 - 2018.2 
Although the companies might operate in many countries, the ARD and ABS focus exclusively 
on the UK operation. The data include all companies larger than 250 employees3 and an annual 
sample of smaller ones. However, numerous companies with employment around the cut-off 
were occasionally dropping in and out of the main sample, and for this reason, only firms with 
employment larger than 300 and for which data availability was for at least four years were 
considered. After these adjustments, the sample consists of 36,912 firm-year observations for 
3,409 firms. 
The main measure of rents is profit before tax per employee. Since profits are very 
volatile and outliers might drive the results, the approach used in Card et al. (2014) was 
followed and for every year observations with profits per employee outside the 1st-99th
percentile range were trimmed.  
The wage bargaining model outlined in Section II demonstrated that the wage-setting 
process is a function of ‘outsider’ forces. These are accounted for by including the industry 
average wage and the nationwide unemployment rate. The data on the industry average wage 
comes from the UK files of EU-KLEMS and the unemployment rate comes from the ONS. For 
the panel of manufacturing companies from ARD and ABS, data on regional-level 
unemployment rates were matched from the Labour Force Survey (1979-1991) and 
NOMIS/LFS (1992-2016). The data on regional-level average hourly wages come from the 
New Earning Survey Panel Database (NESPD). 
III.B. Industry Level Data
The analysis of industries for nine EU countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, UK and Spain) draws from the EU-KLEMS data. For the US, the 
2 ARD until 1997 has only data on companies from production sector. Since 1998 ARD and ABS cover the entire 
economy, but we only keep the production sector for consistency. 
3 To be more precise. All firms larger than 250 are included since the survey year of 1998. Between 1995 and 
1997 all firms larger than 200 employees, and between 1980 and 1994 all firms larger than 100 employees.   
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data source is the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. Both sources provide 
information on productivity, employment and compensation. EU-KLEMS covers the entire 
economy for 28 1-digit (2-digit for manufacturing) sectors and the data are available since the 
1990s until 2015 (coverage differs by country). NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database 
is limited only to the manufacturing sector but provides data for 459 industries in the period 
from 1963 to 2011.  
IIIC. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the top five companies based on market capitalization, employment and 
revenue for 1983, 2000 and 2016 for the top 300 UK firms. In the early 1980s, the UK economy 
was dominated by the manufacturing sector, with companies such as British Petroleum, 
General Electric Company or British American Tobacco making it to the top in all categories. 
Seventeen years later, there is a rise of the banking and finance (HSBC, Aviva, and Prudential), 
telecommunication (Vodafone) and retail (Tesco, Sainsbury) sectors. Within the 
manufacturing sector, pharmaceutical firms (GlaxoSmithKline, AstraZeneca) replaced the 
more traditional electronic and machinery producers at the top. Today, the British ‘superstar’ 
companies originate in the financial, banking and business services, such as G4S, Compass 
Group - the providers of outsourced services. Interestingly, British Petroleum and British 
American Tobacco are found at the top in 1983 and 2016, which testifies to the continued 
importance of the oil and tobacco industries.  
Table 2 and Figure 3 report the average firm size in the top 300 sample (with trimmed 
profits). A U-shaped evolution of mean employment since 1983 until today is seen. At the 
beginning of the 1980s, the average company employed over 15,000 workers and grew until 
the end of the decade. After a drop to around 13,000 employees in 1994, firm size has 
experienced undisrupted growth until 2016. Today the average company in the sample has 
more than 22,000 employees. However, the standard deviation is over twice as large as the 
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mean, indicating a sizeable variation in the firm size – the smallest company in the sample has 
5 employees, whereas the largest employs more than half a million. The time-series might be 
extremely volatile for firms with low employment, and as a robustness check the appendix 
Table A1 reports results that limit the top 300 sample to companies with at least 50 employees. 
Table 2 and Figure 4 document the evolution of mean real revenue, compensation and 
profit per employee expressed in thousands of £2016 (weighted by employment). Average 
revenue and compensation per head grew steadily since 1983 until the Great Recession, after 
which they started falling and, in 2015, they dropped to the levels reported in the early 2000s. 
The year 2016 witnessed a recovery of revenue and wages. Although the reported numbers 
refer to global operations, the sample mean annual compensation in 2016 is £34,400, which is 
close to the UK average for full-time workers. The mean profit per employee is more volatile. 
The positive trend between 1983 and 2011 was interrupted by the recession of 1991-92, the 
dot-com bubble of 1999-2001 and the Great Recession. Profits peaked in the years before and 
after the latter, but since 2011 they have been steadily falling.   
IV. Levels and Trends in Firm-Level Rent Sharing
IV.A. Top 300 Companies
The theoretical considerations in Section II concluded with a formulation of the wage-
setting process as a function of outside forces (unemployment, industry wages), the bargaining 
power of workers and profits per employee.  In particular, the equation for log wages was as 
follows: 
ݓ ≅ ൬ ߶1 െ ߶൰
ߨ
݊ ൅ ݓഥ  
This equation is taken as the basis for formulating and implementing theempirical 
strategy, together with introducing a set of modifications to account for potential endogeneity 
bias. First, the commonality of find long-term employment contracts can generate a certain 
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amount of inertia in wage determination. This possibility is allowed for by inclusion of lagged 
wages and profits into the equation. Second, firm fixed-effects are included, so as to absorb 
time-invariant company characteristics affecting firm performance and wages. Finally, the 
model is first-differenced, which, by construction, leads to a correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the error term (Nickell, 1981). In addition, omitted time-varying firm 
characteristics might drive the correlation between wages and profits. These two sources of 
possible bias are coped with by instrumenting the lagged dependent variable and the current 
and lagged profits in the first-differenced model with their lagged levels (Arellano and Bond, 
1991).  Overall, the rent-sharing elasticity is estimated using a dynamic firm fixed-effect model 
of the following form:  
logݓ௜௝௧ ൌ ߙlog	ݓ௜௝௧ିଵ ൅෍ߚ௟ ߨ݊௜௝௧ି௟
௅
௟ୀ଴
൅෍ߛ௟log	 ௧ܷି௟
௅
௟ୀ଴
൅෍ߜ௟log	ݓഥ௝௧ି௟
௅
௟ୀ଴
൅݂ሺݐ݅݉݁ሻ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߳௜௝௧ 
where the outcome variable ݓ௜௝௧ is log compensation per employee for company i, in industry 
j at time t. The variable of interest ߨ/݊௜௝௧ି௟	is profit before tax per employee, and ߤ௜ captures 
all time-invariant firm effects. Two strategies to control for the outside forces are employed. 
The first controls for the nationwide unemployment rate ௧ܷି௟, the 1-digit industry (2-digit for 
manufacturing) log average wage ݓഥ௝௧ି௟ and for a polynomial time trend (e.g. for a quadratic, 
݂ሺݐ݅݉݁ሻ ൌ ߣଵݐ ൅ ߣଶݐଶ). The second includes the log industry average wage and year fixed 
effects, which account for all nationwide time effects (i.e. ݂ሺݐ݅݉݁ሻ ൌ ߤ௧). Up to three lagged 
values of profits and the outside forces are included (e.g. as in Blanchflower et al., 1996). In 
addition, every regression includes a dummy for significant episodes of mergers and 
acquisitions. Since profits can take negative values, profits per employee are entered in levels, 
however, the reported coefficients are transformed into elasticities.  
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In the above model, the short-run (SR) elasticity is captured by the coefficient	ߚ଴, that 
is, the effect of contemporaneous profits on wages. The long-run (LR) elasticity, for the 
specification with three lags of profits, is given by ሺߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ൅	ߚଶ ൅ ߚଷሻ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ, since in the 
long run ߨ/݊௜௝௧ ൌ ߨ/݊௜௝௧ିଵ ൌ ߨ/݊௜௝௧ିଶ ൌ ߨ/݊௜௝௧ିଷ and ݓ௜௝௧ ൌ ݓ௜௝௧ିଵ.  
Table 3 presents baseline estimates for the whole period 1983-2016. Columns 1 to 4 
use the unemployment rate, the average industry wages and a quadratic polynomial of time to 
account for the outside forces. Various different lag structures are explored across the 
specifications. All columns, except 4, instrument profits with their lagged values. The LR 
elasticities of pay with respect to profits are estimated within the range of 0.010-0.013 and the 
SR elasticity within the range of 0.006-0.010. Columns 5 to 8 use the average industry wages 
and year fixed effects to account for the outside forces. The results remain virtually the same, 
with the LR elasticity within the range of 0.011-0.013 (SR 0.006-0.009). Specifications without 
the instrumented profits (columns 4 and 8) produce a smaller elasticity of 0.006-0.007, which 
is likely due to simultaneity problems with contemporaneous profits. The effects of the outsider 
forces are consistent with the basic theory. The unemployment rate has a null or negative LR 
effect on wages, meaning that worse employment prospect create a downward pressure on 
wages. The average industry wage has a positive impact, indicating an upward pressure on 
wages, when the outside wage is growing.  
The baseline results indicate positive and significant rent sharing among these UK 
companies. How do these estimates compare to the existing empirical studies? As pointed out 
by Card et al. (2018), rent-sharing elasticities estimated using profits should be multiplied by 
the average ratio between value-added and profits (roughly equal to two) in order to compare 
them to estimates based on value-added or revenue. After this adjustment, the estimates of LR 
rent sharing are within the range of 0.020-0.026, which is similar to the UK firm-level estimates 
from Hildreth and Oswald (1997) and Hildreth (1998), but below the estimates from Nickell 
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and Wadhwani (1990) (0.068-0.093). They are also at the lower end of the estimates typically 
found using worker-level data, for instance, from Portugal by Card et al. (2018) (0.04-0.05) or 
from Italy by Card et al. (2014) (0.06-0.08). 
Turning to the evolution of rent sharing over time, Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 look 
separately at the two sub-periods: 1983-2000 and 2001-2016. According to these estimates, 
there is a marked fall in rent sharing since 1983. In the period 1983-2000 the LR elasticity is 
0.043, which is comparable to the existing estimates from that period (Nickell and Wadhwani, 
1990; Hildreth, 1998). However, in the subsequent period 2001-2016, the elasticity is 
approximately three and half times smaller. How economically significant a fall is this? To 
assess this, Lester’s Range (Lester, 1952), that is the spread of wages which can be attributed 
to the dispersion of profits, was calculated.4 Assuming that the distribution of profits is four 
standard deviations, moving from the bottom to the top of the distribution of profits, increases 
wages by approximately 45% in the first period, compared to 20% in the second period. In 
other words, before 2000 almost a half of firm-level wage inequality could be attributed to 
rents, but after 2000, only one-fifth.5   
Next, the fall in rent sharing is considered further as Columns 3 to 6 of Table 4 report 
the estimates for four sub-periods: 1983-1991, 1991-2000, 2000-2009 and 2009-2016.6 The 
rationale for such division is to look separately at the periods before and after the significant 
decline of unions (the early 90s) and at the period after the recent economic crisis (2008-2009). 
The rent-sharing elasticity in the first period is noisily measured, but large and positive at the 
level of 0.050. During the 1990s the elasticity falls to 0.035 but is strongly significant. The 
4 Lester’s Range is defined as the rent-sharing coefficient multiplied four and by the ratio of the standard deviation 
to the mean of profits (Blanchflower et al., 1996).  
5 Is the observed fall in rent sharing merely a result of attenuation bias? Table 2 reports an increasing number of 
small companies with potentially more volatile series. As an additional robustness check, in Table A1 we estimate 
the rent-sharing coefficients only for the sample of companies larger than 50 employees. The results are practically 
unchanged. 
6 Because the data start in 1983, including too many lags of independent variables in the first-period regression 
leads to noisy estimates. Therefore the number of lags is restricted to two for all specifications.  
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falling trend continues after 2000, when the elasticity drops to 0.016, and practically reaches 
zero in the decade after the Great Recession. A similar pattern is reported for the estimates of 
Lester’s Range. At its peak during the 1980s and early 1990’s, rent sharing can account for 
over a half of the firm-level wage inequality, while today only one-tenth.  
Finally, the industry-level leave-out mean profits is used as an alternative instrument 
for firm-level profits. Columns 7 to 10 of Table 4 report the estimates for the four sub-periods. 
Consistent with the literature, instrumenting profits with the industry-level measures tends to 
lead to higher estimates of rent sharing (Card et al., 2018). The first two periods (1983-1991 
and 1991-2000) have a very similar elasticity of 0.060-0.065 and Lester’s Range of around 
63%. However, in the following two periods (2000-2009 and 2009-2016) there is no evidence 
of rent sharing.  
An additional robustness check compares the estimated changes in the rent sharing 
coefficients for nine industries, for specifications with and without instrumented profits by the 
industry-level leave-out means. Each circle in Figure 5 represents the estimated change in the 
industry-specific rent-sharing coefficient between the two periods 2001-2016 and 1983-2000, 
the size of circle marks the average (across time) industry share in the total value added. The 
X-axis is for specifications with industry-level profits as an IV, the Y-axis without. The fitted 
line is very close to a 45-degrees line. Although instrumenting profits changes the estimated 
levels, Figure 5 shows that instrumenting does not matter for the estimated changes. 
IV.B. Manufacturing Companies
Modern companies are increasingly global, with boundaries crossing across not only 
countries, but also continents. Consequently, one should interpret the above results as evidence 
for UK-domiciled companies, since many firms in the sample have operations extending 
beyond the border. While this analysis is still informative about rent sharing in the British 
economy, it can be complemented with a similar analysis of domestic operations from the panel 
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of UK manufacturing companies. The same methodology as previously is adopted, with 
exception that the outsider effects (i.e. average wages and unemployment) are now defined at 
the regional level. In particular, the model now becomes: 
logݓ௜௥௧ ൌ ߙ logݓ௜௥௧ିଵ ൅෍ߚ௟ ߨ݊௜௥௧ି௟
௅
௟ୀ଴
൅෍ߛ௟ log ௥ܷ௧ି௟෍ߜ௟ logݓഥ௥௧ି௟
௅
௟ୀ଴
௅
௟ୀ଴
൅ ݂ሺݐ݅݉݁ሻ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௥௧ 
where i indexes firms, r stands for region and t indicates time. The remainder of the notation 
is the same as previously.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 present the estimates for the whole period 1983-2016. 
Three lags of each independent variable are included. Column 1 includes a second-order 
polynomial of time, column 2 includes year fixed effects. The LR elasticities of pay with 
respect to profits are estimated between 0.012 and 0.015, with the specification including year 
fixed effects located at the lower end of the range. These estimates are almost identical to those 
reported in Table 3 for the top 300 sample over the same period. 
Turning to the evolution of rent sharing, Columns 3 to 6 of Table 5 look separately at 
the four sub-periods: 1983-1991, 1991-2000, 2000-2009 and 2009-2016. Again there is seen 
to be a substantial fall in rent sharing since 1983. In the first period the magnitude of the rent-
sharing elasticity is almost 0.070. In the following periods, however, the coefficient gradually 
falls. Between 1991 and 2000 it is 0.037, between 2000 and 2009 it is 0.033, and finally reaches 
zero after 2009. 
Figure 6 summarizes the evolution of the Lester range for the two UK firm-level 
samples. The lines show a remarkable similarity, indicating that the dramatic fall in rent sharing 
was a characteristic of the whole economy and was not unique to global UK-domiciled public 
companies or the domestic manufacturing sector. The next section shows that the fall in rent 
sharing is, in fact, also visible for EU and US industries. 
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V. Levels and Trends in Industry-Level Rent Sharing 
V.A. Evidence from EU Industries 
The firm-level data show that the rent-sharing coefficient has been falling for the global 
operations of UK-domiciled companies from all sectors, and for the domestic operation of UK-
based manufacturing companies. In this section, industry-level data, which allow study of 
domestic operations across all sectors for the UK and other advanced economies, are analysed. 
The starting point is an analysis of the EU-KLEMS industry-level data, which provides 
information on wages and rents for the same 28 industries across EU countries since the 1990s 
until 20157 (O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009; Jäger, 2016). The UK and eight countries for which 
the data goes back to the early 1990s (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Finland, France, 
Netherlands, and Spain) are studied. The evolution of rent sharing for all the pooled countries 
and industries comprising a panel of 25 years (T) of data for 28 industries (N) is considered. 
Of course, these data are “small N, large T” and therefore not feasible for Arellano-Bond 
estimation and, in general, for dynamic panel models (Roodman, 2009). Therefore, long-run 
changes in wages are regressed on long-run changes in rents measured by profits per worker: 
logݓഥ௝௖௧ െ logݓഥ௝௖௧ି௟ ൌ ߚ ቆߨ݊
ഥ
௝௖௧
െ ߨ݊
ഥ
௝௖௧ି௟
ቇ ൅ ߤ௝ ൅ ߤ௖ ൅ ௝߳௖௧
where ݈	ൌ	14 if 	t	ൌ	2005		and 	݈ ൌ 10 if 	ݐ ൌ 2015.  
The outcome variable ݓ௝௖௧ is log compensation per employee in industry j from country 
c at time t. The variable of interest ߨ/݊௝௖௧	is profits per employee. Country (ߤ௖ሻ / industry fixed 
effects ሺߤ௝ሻ are included. The time breakdown is the fourteen-year change 1991-2005 and the 
ten-year change between 2005 and 2015. In order to reduce measurement error, wages and 
profits for each year are smoothed and replaced with the three-year moving average ݓഥ௝௖௧ and 
ߨത/݊௝௖௧	.  
7 We do not include the 1970s and 1980s, as the provided numbers are estimates. 
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Table 6 presents the estimates of the rent-sharing coefficient for pooled industries and 
countries (the coefficient ߚ).8 Each row displays results for separate periods, for instance, the 
first row shows the effect of the change between 1991 and 2005 in profits per employee on the 
change in the same period in log wages. In the first period, the correlation between profits and 
wages, 0.0012-0.0019, is consistently positive and significant. It corresponds to a Lester Range 
of 3-5%. In the second period, the estimates are practically zero. Interestingly, the inclusion of 
industry and country fixed effects matters little for the estimates, suggesting that the fall of rent 
sharing cannot be explained by a shift from high to low rent-sharing sectors or country-specific 
changes. 
V.B. Evidence from US Manufacturing 
The evolution of rent sharing in the US is studied using the NBER-CES Manufacturing 
Industry data for the period from 1963 to 2011. Although the data covers only the production 
sector, it allows us to use 459 4-digit industries and avoid the “small N, large T” problem. The 
rent-sharing elasticity is produced in a similar fashion as it was in the firm-level analysis by 
using a dynamic industry fixed-effect model of the following form: 
logݓ௝௧ ൌ ߙlog	ݓ௝௧ିଵ ൅෍ߚ௟ ߨ݊௝௧ି௟
௅
௟ୀ଴
൅෍ߛ௟log	 ௧ܷି௟
௅
௟ୀ଴
൅෍ߜ௟log	ݓഥ௝௧ି௟
௅
௟ୀ଴
൅݂ሺݐ݅݉݁ሻ ൅ ߤ௝ ൅ ௝߳௧ 
where the outcome variable ݓ௝௧ is log compensation per employee for manufacturing industry 
j at time t. The variable of interest ߨ/݊௝௧ି௟	is profit before tax per employee and ߤ௝ captures 
time-invariant industry effects. Outsider forces are either controlled for via inclusion of the log 
nationwide unemployment rate ௧ܷି௟, the log 2-digit industry average wage ݓഥ௝௧ି௟9 and for a 
8 We also run regressions for the UK industries only and find very similar levels and evolution of the rent-sharing 
coefficients as in the pooled sample. The results are available upon request. 
9 Regressing a variable on its group’s mean mechanically leads to a coefficient of one for the mean and zero for 
other variables. To avoid this problem, we use the 2-digit average industry wages from the IPUMS-CPS March 
files (Flood et al., 2017).  
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polynomial of time, or by the log industry average wage and year fixed effects. Up to three 
lagged values of profits and the outsider forces are incorporated. Again the model is first-
differenced and lagged dependent variable and the current and lagged profits are instrumented 
with their lagged levels (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The level of profits per employee is used 
in a log-levels specification, however we transform the reported coefficients into elasticities.  
Column 1 of Table 7 reports the estimates for the whole period 1963-2011 for 
specifications with three lags and year fixed effects. There is a positive and significant rent-
sharing parameter with magnitude 0.014 and Lester’s Range of 8%. This estimate is, 
nevertheless, almost five times smaller than those reported in Blanchflower, Oswald and 
Sanfey (1996) for the shorter period between 1964 and 1985. Can this difference be attributed 
to a fall in rent sharing after 1985? To check for this possibility, Columns 2 to 6 of Table 7 
split the sample into five periods: 1963-1974, 1974-1983, 1983-1991, 1991-2000 and 2000-
2011. Results from specifications with the log of average 2-digit industry wages and year fixed 
effects are reported. The rent-sharing elasticity over the first period (column 1) is 0.054, which 
is close to the estimates from Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996). However already in 
the 1970s and 1980s (columns 2 and 3) there is a decline to around 0.014. The two most recent 
periods, 1991-2000 and 2000-2011 are marked by near-zero estimates, implying an almost 
complete lack of rent sharing in the US manufacturing sector. Lester’s Range declines as well, 
from around 17% in the first period, to around 5.5% between 1974 and 1991 to just 2.5% since 
1991. These findings are consistent with Bell and Van Reenen (2011), who use the same data 
and find no evidence for rent sharing in the period 1986-2005. 
Figure 6 summarizes the evolution of Lester’s Range for the EU-KLEMS and NBER-
CES samples, in comparison with the UK firm-level samples. The results are consistent across 
samples and show a negative trend in rent sharing. The fall among the US manufacturing 
industries happened earlier, in the 1970-80s, than in Europe, which experienced a dramatic fall 
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after the turn of the millennium. Finally, the difference in the level of the Lester range and 
change between the industry and firm-level estimates, stems from the lower rent-sharing 
coefficients and smaller dispersion of profits at the industry level. 
VI. Changes in Rent Sharing, Market Power and Labour Share
The evidence considered so far shows that UK-domiciled companies share profits with 
workers, but much less so now than they used to. The same pattern emerges for industries in 
the US and nine EU countries. What has driven this decline?  One consistent finding in the 
recent literature that is focused on the labour share has been the connection between the falling 
labour share and growing market concentration (Autor et al., 2017; Barkai, 2016; De Loecker 
and Eeckhout, 2017; Adrjan, 2018). This begs the question whether the observed decline in 
rent-sharing has been more pronounced among those firms with more market power. This 
section offers evidence on this question. 
To do so, the firm-level data are returned to with an aim to explore whether companies 
with high market power share more or less of their profits, and whether this has changed over 
time. Firm market share is the measure of market power that is considered. However, it is often 
unclear for global companies how to define their market of reference. For supermarket chains 
that are primarily domestically focused (e.g. Tesco) one could argue that the UK retail sector 
is an appropriate reference market, but for more global companies (e.g. British Petroleum or 
HSBC) one should arguably look at the worldwide market. In other words, taking the UK 
industry revenue or employment from EU-KLEMS could be a valid option for Tesco, but not 
for British Petroleum. A lack of information on the size of the global operation, generates a 
need to take an alternative approach and define the company’s reference market as the sample’s 
industry total. 
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Therefore, firm-level market share is the firm’s revenue or employment share in the 
sample’s industry total. A composite sample for the industry total is constructed, in order to 
ensure that changes in sample size do not drive the results. By construction, the size of the 
sample varies, implying larger industry total for years with more observations. Without 
correction this would then underestimate market share in the middle of the sample window and 
overestimate at the ends. To adjust for this, the approach taken in in Nickell (1996) is adopted. 
This imputes the number of ‘outside the top’ observations for all years using the sample 
composition from 1996-1999 (when the sample size peaks). Second, owing to exclusion of 
companies which were within the top 300 for less than three years, the ends of the sample 
(1983-84 and 2015-16) have less ‘at the top’ observations. These are imputed using the sample 
composition from 1985 and 2014 correspondingly.  
Market share for company i from industry j at time t is: 
ܯ ௜ܵ௝௧ ൌ ܴ௜௝௧௝ܴ௧
where the denominator ܴ ௝௧ is the sum of revenue for 1-digit (2-digit for manufacturing) industry 
j at time t, calculated for the adjusted composite sample. The market share of employment can 
be computed analogously.  
Figure 7 illustrates the growth of the median and the upper quartile of the market share 
measures since 1983. Market share exhibits a U-shaped evolution through time, which is 
especially visible for the 75th percentile, which dips in the early 1990s and then peaks after the 
Great Recession. The median company in 1983 earned and employed around 1.5% of its 
industry total revenue and employment. Thirty-three years later the median share had grown to 
2%.  
The same empirical strategy as for the earlier firm-level analysis is adopted, but, in 
addition, now exploring whether companies with higher market power share more or less of 
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their profits. In particular, profits are interacted with the measure of market share in the 
following way: 
logݓ௜௝௧ ൌ ߙlog	ݓ௜௝௧ିଵ ൅෍ߚ௟ ߨ݊௜௝௧ି௟
௅
௟ୀ଴
൅෍ߴ௟ܯ ௜ܵ௝௧ି௟
௅
௟ୀ଴
൅෍ߠ௟ ߨ݊௜௝௧ି௟ ൈ ܯ ௜ܵ௝௧ି௟
௅
௟ୀ଴
൅෍ߜ௟log	ݓഥ௝௧ି௟ ൅
௅
௟ୀ଴
ߤ௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߳௜௝௧ 
The notation is as in Section IV. For the sake of brevity only the model with time fixed 
effects is reported (without the nation-wide unemployment rate). The model is estimated 
separately for the two sub-periods: 1983-2000 and 2001-2016.  
Figure 8 displays the long-run rent-sharing coefficients calculated for different 
moments of the revenue-based market share distributions (i.e. the 10th, 25th, 75th and 90th 
percentiles). Consistently across time periods, companies with high market power have on 
average higher rent sharing than companies with low power.10 However, the positive 
association between market power and rent sharing is significantly weaker in the period 2001-
2016 compared to 1983-2001. In other words, the fall in rent sharing was more pronounced 
among the companies, which enjoy monopolistic markups. Virtually the same results are 
obtained using an employment-based measure of market power (available upon request). These 
results are at best indicative of the role of market power since the differences are not 
statistically significant and the measure of market power is imperfect, but suggests an 
interesting area for further research. 
VII. Conclusions
Recently, and particularly since real wage stagnation and the sluggish productivity 
performance of many countries have persisted in the wake of the financial crisis, many 
10 A positive association between rent sharing and market power is also reported in Card et al. (2014). 
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commentators have expressed concerns around not achieving inclusive growth. One key 
feature of inclusive growth that traditionally has been highlighted is whether or not companies 
share the gains from productivity and higher profits with workers. An older literature that 
typically utilised data from time periods before wage inequality started rising tended to 
emphasise that rent sharing was a key feature of the way in which worker bargaining power 
did in fact redistribute to wages. 
This paper presents a range of evidence to show that the extent of rent sharing has 
declined very sharply over time. And that the decline is, if anything, more marked where firm 
market power has risen. This is the case for a specially constructed panel of UK publicly listed 
firms over the period 1983-2016, where the analysis shows that a significant and economically 
substantial role for profit sharing in wage determination in the 1980s and 1990s has vanished 
since around the start of the new millennium. A similar story holds for the EU and US, though 
the decline occurred earlier in the US. 
These findings are important looking forward if a goal is to figure out the means by 
which inclusive growth can be generated in advanced countries. Rising firm markups, product 
market concentration and labour market concentration are all current trends that run counter to 
this and make it a challenging and difficult aim. Evidently, more needs to be done to better 
understand the ways that wage setting arrangements of modern corporations operating in a 
globalised world can be improved to raise productivity and to reward workers in a fair and 
equitable way at the same time. 
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Figure 1: The Number of Listings on the London Stock Exchange
Notes: The black solid line denotes the total number of listings on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The black dashed line 
marks the number of listings, which are used to construct the top 300 sample represented by the grey line. See the text for 
more details on the sample construction. Source: LSPD, own calculations. 
Figure 2: Composition of the Top 300 Sample 
Notes: The grey line denotes the total number of companies in the top 300 sample. The black solid line marks the number of 
companies, which were within the top 300 in a given year. The black dashed line shows the number of companies, which were 
not within the top 300 in a given year, but were in the top for some other year between 1983 and 2016. Source: LSPD, own 
calculations. 
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Figure 3: Mean Employment in the Top 300 Sample 
Notes: The graph presents the mean employment for companies in the top 300 sample with trimmed profits per employee 
(top/bottom 1%). Source: author’s construction based on various sources (see the text). 
Figure 4: Real Revenue, Compensation and Profit per Employee in the Top 300 Sample
Notes: The graph presents the weighted mean of total revenue, compensation and profit before taxation per employee, deflated 
by the CPI. The data are for companies in the top 300 sample with trimmed profits per employee (top/bottom 1%). Source: 
author’s construction based on various sources (see the text). 
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Figure 5: Industry-Specific Changes in Rent Sharing 
Notes: Arellano-Bond estimates from the first-differenced firm-level regression of log compensation per employee, on the 
lagged depended variable, profits per employee, the log average industry wages and year fixed effects. Profits were 
instrumented using the industry-level leave-out means of profits. Each circle represents the estimated change between the two 
periods 2001-2016 and 1983-2000, the size of circle marks the average (across time) sector share in the total value added.  
Figure 6: The Evolution of the Lester Range
Notes: For “Industry: US manufacturing” the periods 2000-2009 and 2009-2016 are the same and correspond to 2000-2011. 
For “Industry: EU-KLEMS” the period 2009-2016 corresponds to 2009-2015. 
34 
Figure 7: Market Share 
Notes: The graph presents the evolution of the 75th (p75), median (p50) and 25th (p25) percentiles of market share. The black 
lines marks estimates based on revenue. The grey line marks estimates based on employment. Data is for companies in the top 
300 sample with trimmed profits per employee (top/bottom 1%). Source: author’s construction based on various sources (see 
the text). 
Figure 8: Firm-Level Rent Sharing and Market Share of Revenue
Notes: The Arellano-Bond estimates from the first-differenced firm-level regression of log compensation per employee on the 
lagged depended variable, profits per employee, market share of revenue, the interaction term between market share and 
profits, the log average industry wages and year fixed effects. Three lags of all independent variables are included. Data are 
for companies in the top 300 sample with trimmed profits (top/bottom 1%). Standard errors clustered at firm level. 
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Table 1: Rankings of Companies in the Top 300 Sample 
1983 2000 2016 
Market Capitalization (in mln) Market Capitalization (in mln) Market Capitalization (in mln) 
1 British Petroleum  7421 Vodafone Group  158124 HSBC Holdings  130498 
2 General Electric Company 4888 British Petroleum  121844 British Petroleum  99236 
3 Imperial Chemical Industries 3880 GlaxoSmithKline  118910 British American Tobacco 86162 
4 Marks and Spencer Group 2830 HSBC Holdings  91284 GlaxoSmithKline  76695 
5 British American Tobacco 2631 AstraZeneca  59619 AstraZeneca  56137 
Employment Employment Employment 
1 British American Tobacco 187173 Unilever  295000 G4S  592897 
2 General Electric Company 170865 Anglo American 249000 Compass Group 527180 
3 Grand Metropolitan 136297 Sainsbury 185200 Tesco  464520 
4 British Petroleum  131600 HSBC Holdings  161624 HSBC Holdings 235175 
5 Unilever  127000 Tesco  152210 Sainsbury 181900 
Revenue (in mln) Revenue (in mln) Revenue (in mln) 
1 British Petroleum  32381 British Petroleum  97900 British Petroleum  136100 
2 Imperial Chemical Industries 8256 Aviva  40244 Legal and General Group 77969 
3 British American Tobacco 7904 HSBC Holdings  33182 Prudential 71842 
4 Barclays  7888 Unilever  28977 HSBC Holdings 60495 
5 National Westminster Bank  6605 Prudential  28078 Tesco 55917 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Year N Mean SD Min Max 
Employment 
1983 337 15104 25974 27 187173 
2000 413 14831 30645 22 295000 
2016 307 22939 59283 5 592897 
Compensation per Employee 
(in th £2016) 
1983 323 18.6 7.5 1.8 75.4 
2000 413 29.7 16.0 0.6 315.8 
2016 307 34.4 24.4 1.1 525.0 
Revenue per Employee (in th 
£2016) 
1983 333 124.4 119.6 11.4 4734.2 
2000 413 205.1 262.1 2.9 7958.4 
2016 307 216.9 458.1 0.0 9447.4 
Profit per Employee (in th 
£2016) 
1983 337 8.7 9.4 -0.1 408.4 
2000 413 17.4 30.7 -160.9 1092.2 
2016 307 11.7 33.5 -722.3 914.5 
Notes: Compensation, Revenue and Profit before taxation per employee are deflated by the CPI and expressed in £2016. The 
data are for companies in the top 300 sample with trimmed profits per employee (top/bottom 1%). Source: author’s 
construction based on various sources (see the text). 
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Table 3: Firm-Level Rent Sharing 1983-2016 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 0.477*** 0.488*** 0.43*** -0.177*** 0.478*** 0.494*** 0.445*** -0.187*** 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.052) (0.028) (0.035) (0.036) (0.054) (0.028) 
 
 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.01*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
 - -0.002** -0.003 0 - -0.002* -0.003 0.001 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
 
 - - 0.002 0 - - 0.002 0.001 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
 
 - - -0.001 -0.002** - - -0.001 -0.002** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
 0.004 -0.017 0.018 0.005 0 0.001 0.011 0.006 
(0.008) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.012) 
 
 - 0.045 -0.048 -0.021 - 0.005 0.003 -0.007 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.015) (0.038) (0.036) (0.015) 
 
 - - 0.11** 0.03 - - 0.102 0.004 
(0.054) (0.019) (0.074) (0.02) 
 
 - - 0.014 0.074*** - - -0.054 0.039 
(0.053) (0.025) (0.07) (0.026) 
 
 0.005 0.043*** -0.006 0.025* - - - - 
(0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
 - -0.047*** -0.034 -0.029* - - - - 
(0.013) (0.022) (0.016) 
 
 - - 0.109*** 0.066*** - - - - 
(0.024) (0.019) 
 
 - - -0.124*** -0.048*** - - - - 
(0.018) (0.016) 
LR Coefficient 0.011 0.010 0.013 0.006 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.007 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Lester Range 0.158 0.144 0.183 0.093 0.160 0.155 0.182 0.108 
Firm-Years 11478 11380 9751 9751 11478 11380 9751 9751 
Firms 832 829 731 731 832 829 731 731 
Time Quad Quad Quad Quad Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE 
Instruments Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) No Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) No 
Notes: OLS (Columns 4 and 8) and Arellano-Bond estimates from the first-differenced firm-level regression of log 
compensation per employee, on the lagged depended variable, profits per employee, the log average industry wages, the log 
unemployment rate and quadratic time trend (Columns 1-4) or year fixed effects (Columns 5-8). Various lags of all independent 
variables are included. Data are for companies in the top 300 sample with trimmed profits per employee (top/bottom 1%). 
Standard errors clustered at firm level. *** p<0.001, ** p<001, * p<0.05. 
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Table 4: The Evolution of Firm-Level Rent Sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1983-
2000 
2001-
2016 
1983-
1991 
1991-
2000 
2000-
2009 
2009-
2016 
1983-
1991 
1991-
2000 
2000-
2009 
2009-
2016 
  0.376*** 0.428*** 0.620*** 0.438*** 0.512*** 0.253*** 0.351* 0.359*** 0.597*** 0.265*** 
(0.086) (0.062) (0.161) (0.077) (0.057) (0.083) (0.183) (0.129) (0.085) (0.098) 
  0.017*** 0.01*** 0.002 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.004 0.013 0.033*** 0.008* 0.005 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) 
  0 -0.003 0.014 -0.003 -0.005 0.002 0.014 0.006 -0.006 0.007** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.025) (0.011) (0.008) (0.003) 
  0.004 0.002 0.003 0.006* 0.002 -0.001 0.014 -0.001 -0.003 -0.008* 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.025) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
  0.006* -0.002* - - - - - - - - 
(0.003) (0.001) 
  -0.007 0.012 -0.136 -0.010 0.121* 0.006 -0.066 -0.021 0.039 0.018 
 
(0.026) (0.021) (0.106) (0.028) (0.066) (0.018) (0.057) (0.026) (0.070) (0.017) 
0.077 0.002 0.184 0.152 0.118 0.001 -0.004 0.019 -0.039 -0.020 
(0.116) (0.038) (0.227) (0.136) (0.119) (0.033) (0.060) (0.028) (0.066) (0.026) 
  -0.116 0.18* 0.000 -0.199 -0.140 0.198 -0.021 -0.030 -0.142 0.159* 
(0.116) (0.101) (0.210) (0.127) (0.140) (0.126) (0.037) (0.029) (0.086) (0.090) 
  -0.04 -0.016 - - - - - - - - 
(0.099) (0.09) 
LR Coeff. 0.043 0.012 0.050 0.035 0.016 0.007 0.065 0.060 -0.003 0.006 
(0.013) (0.004) (0.042) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.053) (0.021) (0.028) (0.012) 
Lester R. 0.445 0.200 0.486 0.373 0.277 0.104 0.627 0.642 -0.056 0.095 
Firm-Years 4719 5032 1,901 3,748 3,437 2,474 1,897 3,748 3,437 2,474 
Firms 547 503 404 539 494 379 404 539 494 379 
Time Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE 
Instruments Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Ind. Profits 
Ind. 
Profits 
Ind. 
Profits 
Ind. 
Profits 
Notes: The Arellano-Bond estimates from the first-differenced firm-level regression of log compensation per employee, on 
the lagged depended variable, profits per employee, the log average industry wages, and year fixed effects. Three (Columns 
1-2) or two (Columns 3-10) lags of all independent variables are included. Data are for companies in the top 300 sample with 
trimmed profits per employee (top/bottom 1%). In columns 1-6, profits are instrumented with their previous lags. In columns 
7-10, profits are instrumented with the industry-level leave-out means. Standard errors clustered at firm level. *** p<0.001, 
** p<001, * p<0.05. 
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Table 5: Manufacturing Firm-Level Rent Sharing (Domestic Operation) 
Dependent Variable: Log ݓ௜௥௧ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1983-2016 1983-2016 1983-1991 1991-2000 2000-2009 2009-2016 
  0.372*** 0.370*** 0.466*** 0.365*** 0.174*** 0.239*** 
(0.027) (0.037) (0.04) (0.034) (0.062) (0.042) 
  0.0150*** 0.0135*** 0.058** 0.042*** 0.014* 0.016 
(0.012) (0.007) (0.026) (0.014) (0.007) (0.011) 
  0.0022 0.00251 -0.013 -0.001 0.009 -0.002 
(0.01) (0.006) (0.022) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) 
  -0.00942*** -0.00982*** -0.014** -0.021*** -0.008 -0.004 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
  0.00177 0.00159 0.006 0.003 0.012** -0.005 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
  0.446*** 0.0301 -1.209** 0.411 0.258 -1.286** 
(0.167) (0.287) (0.598) (0.275) (0.472) (0.595) 
  0.412*** 0.711** -0.865 1.257** -0.048 1.347 
(0.389) (0.578) (1.43) (0.522) (0.846) (0.886) 
  -0.185* 0.541* 4.073* 0.753 1.178 0.11 
(0.361) (0.71) (2.103) (0.48) (0.95) (0.939) 
  0.155 -0.333 0.131 0.322 0.335 -1.026 
(0.393) (0.639) (2.074) (0.477) (0.545) (1.073) 
  -0.110*** -0.0631* -0.236*** 0.134 0.019 -0.169 
(0.041) (0.066) (0.087) (0.103) (0.079) (0.127) 
  0.0973*** -0.192** -0.522** -0.274 0.121 -0.107 
(0.127) (0.113) (0.251) (0.197) (0.178) (0.183) 
  0.0222 0.0361 0.337 -0.273 -0.207 0.476** 
(0.153) (0.148) (0.307) (0.23) (0.194) (0.238) 
  0.0525*** 0.0419 -0.115 0.182 0.155 -0.077 
(0.157) (0.121) (0.302) (0.192) (0.187) (0.156) 
LR Coefficient 0.015 0.012 0.069 0.037 0.033 0.007 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.054) (0.03) (0.015) (0.02) 
Lester Range 0.18 0.15 0.542 0.329 0.406 0.076 
Firm-Years 27250 27250 13,374 9,164 3,700 3,108 
Firms 2797 2797 2,058 1,606 841 619 
Time Quad Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE 
Instruments Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) 
Notes: The Arellano-Bond estimates from the first-differenced firm-level regression of log compensation per employee, on 
the lagged depended variable, profits per employee, log average regional wages, log regional unemployment rate and quadratic 
polynomial of time (Column 1)  or year fixed effects (Columns 2-6). Three lags of all independent variables are included. Data 
are for manufacturing companies from ARD and ABS, with trimmed profits per employee (top/bottom 1%). Standard errors 
clustered at firm level. *** p<0.001, ** p<001, * p<0.05. 
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Table 6: Industry-Level Rent Sharing in the EU
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1991-2005 
 
0.0019*** 0.0015*** 0.0017*** 0.0012*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Lester Range 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 
2005-2015 
-0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Lester Range 0 0 0 0 
Observations 255 255 255 255 
Country FE No Yes No Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes 
Notes: The pooled OLS estimates from the industry-level regression of the 14-years (1991-2005) or 10-
years (2005-2015) change in log compensation per employee on the analogous change in log value added 
per employee, country fixed effects (Columns 2 and 5) and industry fixed effects (Columns 3 and 4), run 
separately for each period. The changes are calculated for the 3-years averages. Source: EU-KLEMS, own 
calculations. *** p<0.001, ** p<001, * p<0.05. 
Dependent Variable: Log ݓ௜௝௧ - Log ݓ௜௝௧ି௟
(ߨ/݊ሻ௜௝ଶ଴଴ହ -  (ߨ/݊ሻ௜௝ଵଽଽଵ 
(ߨ/݊ሻ௜௝ଶ଴ଵହ -  (ߨ/݊ሻ௜௝ଶ଴଴ହ 
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Table 7: Industry-Level Rent Sharing in US Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1963-2011 1963-1974 1974-1983 1983-1991 1991-2000 2000-2011 
 
0.729*** 0.362*** 0.606*** 0.382*** 0.506*** 0.508*** 
 
(0.016) (0.044) (0.029) (0.049) (0.028) (0.031) 
0.005** 0.037*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.010*** -0.005 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
-0.003 -0.010** -0.001 0.004 -0.002 -0.005* 
 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
0.001 0.009** -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
0.034*** 0.065*** 0.047* 0.066*** 0.051*** 0.008 
 
(0.008) (0.020) (0.026) (0.022) (0.016) (0.014) 
0.025* 0.101** -0.004 0.039 0.030 0.006 
 
(0.012) (0.051) (0.030) (0.030) (0.023) (0.018) 
0.029* 0.082* 0.065 0.098*** 0.026 -0.033* 
 
(0.014) (0.050) (0.040) (0.029) (0.030) (0.018) 
0.064*** -0.027** 0.140*** 0.100*** 0.077*** 0.042** 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.033) (0.036) (0.026) (0.018) 
LR Coefficient 0.014 0.054 0.013 0.014 0.004 0.005 
(0.005) (0.019) (0.012) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
Lester Range 0.082 0.174 0.045 0.064 0.019 0.032 
Industry-Years 21004 4590 4590 4130 4550 4972 
Industries 459 459 459 459 458 452 
Time Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE 
Instruments Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) 
Notes: The Arellano-Bond estimates from the first-differenced industry-level regression of log compensation per employee, 
on the lagged depended variable, profits per employee, the log average industry wages and year fixed effects. Three lags of all 
independent variables are included. Data are from IPUMS-CPS March files and NBER-CES Manufacturing database. Standard 
errors clustered at industry level. *** p<0.001, ** p<001, * p<0.05.
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Appendix 
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Annual Respondents Database (ARD): Office for National Statistics, , 1973-2008: Secure Data Service 
Access [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], March 2011. SN: 6644. 
Compustat: Standard & Poor, 1980-2018. Access on-line through Warton Research Data Services 
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EU-KLEMS: Jäger, K. (2016). EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts 2017 Release, 
Statistical Module1. December, http://www.euklems.net/TCB/2016/Metholology_EU% 
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Table A1: The Evolution of Firm-Level Rent Sharing for Firms with Employment > 50. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1983-2000 2001-2016 1983-1991 1991-2000 2000-2009 2009-2016 
  0.389*** 0.434*** 0.622*** 0.410*** 0.486*** 0.269*** 
(0.084) (0.072) (0.160) (0.080) (0.060) (0.084) 
  0.018*** 0.010*** 0.002 0.017*** 0.009** 0.007** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
  -0.004 -0.001 0.013 -0.007** -0.001 -0.000 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
  0.005 0.001 0.002 0.006* 0.001 -0.002 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
  0.004 -0.003** 
(0.003) (0.001) 
  -0.007 0.005 -0.138 -0.005 0.156** 0.003 
(0.025) (0.021) (0.105) (0.028) (0.063) (0.018) 
  0.088 0.015 0.184 0.128 0.074 0.005 
(0.118) (0.039) (0.227) (0.138) (0.118) (0.034) 
  -0.174 0.142 0.000 -0.234* -0.071 0.141 
(0.119) (0.094) (0.209) (0.138) (0.118) (0.113) 
  -0.023 0.043 
(0.097) (0.083) 
LR Coefficient 0.038 0.011 0.044 0.026 0.017 0.006 
(0.012) (0.004) (0.039) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) 
Lester Range 0.360 0.167 0.406 0.250 0.267 0.089 
Firm-Years 4,703 4,994 1,896 3,725 3,405 2,449 
Firms 542 497 403 532 486 375 
Time Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE 
Instruments Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) Lag(2/.) 
Notes: The Arellano-Bond estimates from the first-differenced firm-level regression of log compensation per employee, on 
the lagged depended variable, profits per employee, the log average industry wages, and year fixed effects. Three (Columns 
1-2) or two (Columns 3-5) lags of all independent variables are included. Data are for companies in the top 300 sample, which 
average employment is larger than 50, with trimmed profits per employee (top/bottom 1%). Profits are instrumented with their 
previous lags. Standard errors clustered at firm level. *** p<0.001, ** p<001, * p<0.05. 
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